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Introduction

S

trategy is about solving problems-in fact, the best strategy is the best solution to that problem. This very simple way oflooking at strategy is in itself
very complex. The problem that needs to be solved must be well defined and understood and the strategic solution has to be feasible with the means that are in
hand. To complicate things further, most of the situations that need solving are
probably all "in the future." Additionally, the p roblem may be simply stated as
"'terrorism," but we all know that is not enough. Apart from some novelist, who
could have conceived that commercial airplanes could be used in such a horrible
manner as they were on September I I?
This "'solution" must also fit scenarios that themselves will undoubtedly differ
from region to region throughout the world, even from country to country. A resolution that is good for one region or country may not be applicable to another.
Thus, when in 1947, a Chilean lawyer from Vifia del Mar-does anybody today remember his name?l-presented his theory of an expanded coastal State territorial
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sea, who anticipated that it would evolve into the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that is now universally accepted? In 1947, he was presenting a
solution for the risk to the national whaling industry as foreign whalers operating
just off Chilean shores were very quickly exterminating the mammals.
Solutions also have their own levels of responsibility: the political or grand strategic level
decision makers have to be able to recognize the problems, state their objectives and
create the necessary means-and perhaps the legal structure-to attain them. On the
other hand, the "means" or forces that will implement the policies need clear-cut instructions as to what they can or cannot do in resolving the problem. As we all know
with regard to threats at sea, there will always be a conflict between the freedom of the
seas and certain control measures that would help to confront the threats effectively.
Globalization has resulted in the rapid advance of communications capabilities
and technology, a great mobility of humans and capital, a weakening of commercial
barriers and the creation of important multinational corporations, which every day
acquire a greater importance in international affairs. All this has made borders
more penneable and the world economies more interdependent, with all the advantages and disadvantages that this entails. Globalization provides enormous benefits and opportunities, but it also has negative effects. Unfortunately the benefits
are still concentrated in a few nations, creating false expectations, rivalries, tensions
and divisions among the rest. We know that today most conflicts are intra-State
conflicts. These originate for multiple reasons, induding lack of governance, corruption and ethnic and religious problems. All of these are causes of instability, civil
war, social disorder, systematic violations of human rights, massive migration and
frontier tensions. These effects not only create instability in the States where theyoccur but also have the potential to cause negative repercussions within the region or
throughout the whole international system. The world has seen a polarization of
those who support and those who oppose globalization. The fonner focus on the
possible benefits associated with participating in the global economy. The latter are
concerned that they are too far removed from the level of economic development
that would pennit them access to globalization's benefits, or they consider globalization to be the cause of all their problems-the loss of national identity, the relaxation of moral values and the weakening of the principle of sovereignty of States.
In a globalized world, we have not only the traditional threats, but new threats
giving rise to new risks have emerged. These are not planned or organized by a
State-at least not openly. These risks rise from the proliferation of international
criminal organizations, piracy, cyber attacks, small arms trafficking, the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking and terrorism. We must also mention potential AIDS and bird flu pandemics and natural disasters and other problems, such as droughts, floods, soil degradation and overexploitation of natural
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resources. All these phenomena are considered transnational, as they cross international boundaries.
Writing from the perspective of a distant country our objective is to show the
importance of the sea to Chile as a maritime nation and how turning to some "old"
ideas may help find an effective and efficient way to create the indispensable cooperation needed to confront the "new" threats that affect the world.

The New Th reats at Sea
The sea has always contributed to human development through its four main attributes: its resources, its utility as a means of transportation and trade, as a means of
exchanging information and, fmally, as a source of power and dominion.2 In the
past, the maritime resources of most States were mainly dedicated to pursuing their
national interests relating to military power and dominion. Today the new threats,
particularly those which threaten the en vironment and transportation, must be confronted in a new way. "Good order at sea") requires three very important issues to be
addressed effectively: maritime awareness, maritime policy and integrated mar itime
governance. Simply reflecting on the titles of these issues indicates the need for a
wide base of understanding if we are to succeed in combating the new threats.
Today the use of the global commons presents much more complex problems
than when it was referred to as a "wide common" by Admiral Mahan late in the
nineteenth century.4 Today the threats and risks cover a very wid e range. We will
only discuss some that we consider especially important.
As addressed at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2003, piracy, which has existed
from time immemorial, has now emerged in a new form: " Piracy and armed robbery against ships and the potential fo r terrorist attacks on vulnerable sea shipping
threaten the growth of the Asia-Pacific region and disrupt the stability of global
commerce, particularly as these have become tools for transnational organized
crime."s Other threats from and on the global commons include smuggling, drug
trafficking, illegal immigration, banditry, human smuggling and slavery, environmental attack, trade disruption, and weapons proliferation, including weapons o f
mass destruction and terrorism. 6

Chilean Mari time Interests
Chile, with its unique shape, is not a very large country in terms ofits land territory,
but its length entitles it to a huge expanse of territorial and exclusive economic
zone waters. If you add to this Chile's geographical position in the world, plus an
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economic system that is outward looking, you can understand that for Chileans the
sea is of great importance.
From 1990 to 2005, Chile's foreign trade by sea rose from thirty million metric tons
to seventy million tons. In 2005, 85 percent of Chile's foreign trade was by sea. That
year, Chilean exports transported by ship totaled $14.5 billion to Asia and Oceania,
$9.8 billion to Europe, $7.6 billion to North America and $125 million to Africa.1
Although Chile is far removed from many areas of the world, events occurring
elsewhere can quickly and negatively impact Chile. As an example, although the
rise in foreign trade was generally steady from 1990 to 2005, the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which had nothing to do with Chile, led to a decrease in Chilean shipping and hardships for the Chilean economy that lasted for several years.
Key Vulnerabilities
Chile heavily depends on its sea lines of communication. Nearly 90 percent of its
increasing foreign trade must travel by sea, 100 percent offuel imports come by sea
and by 2009 most of the natural gas needed will come as liquefied natural gas on
ships whose cargoes can themselves be a weapon of mass destruction in the hands
of terrorists and will, of course, require special security.
Although Chile is in a geographic region that to date has not been the subject of
serious terrorist threats, the government is aware of the dangers that terrorism
presents. This is why Chile is party to numerous international conventions.8 The
latest international treaties ratified are an expression of our agreemen t with the international effort to combat terrorism following the 9/ 11 attacks.
illegal fishing and overexploitation of fishery resources are a worldwide concern
and Chile is no exception. To address these, the government has imposed quotas
on Chilean fishing companies that fish in our exclusive economic zone and
Presential Sea, but it has not been possible to prevent illegal fishing by foreign enterprises that are obviously overexploiting some areas and endangering certain
highly migratory and straddling stocks.
Pollution of our seas is also a major threat to Chile. As o ne example, Chile is one
of the most importan t producers of salmon, which require dean water.
The Panama Canal is of primary importance for Chile. Chilean shipping is the
fourth largest world user and largest South American user of the canaL Any interruption to the flow of shipping through the canal will immediately affect our economy and Chilean exports may become uncompetitive because of increased
shipping costs and times.
The Strait of Magellan and Drake Passage, although not the busiest sea lanes in
the world, are of great importance as an alternative to the Panama CanaL The use
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of these passages is growing yearly as a consequence not only of the increase in
world trade, but also due to the increase in post-Panamax vessels (those too large to
transit the Panama Canal), vessels carrying dangerous cargoes prohibited from canal transits, and technology advances that now allow larger ships to sail the high
latitudes safely. These increases in the use of the Strait of Magellan and Drake Passage raise the risk of collisions.

Chilean Policy
Chilean defense policy recognizes that-apart from providing the traditional aspects
of protecting the citizens and national interests and safeguarding territorial integrity
and sovereignty-a modern view must include international security and stability as
factors that affect Chile's own national security.9Although oriented in the first place to
dissuade any threats, it recognizes that defense forces must be prepared to act coercively in defense of national interests if dissuasion doesn't work. It also quite definitely
expresses that Chile is prepared to cooperate with other States,IOespecially under UN
mandates, as the best way to address non-conventional threats.
In the near term, Chilean foreign policy has the challenge of increasing Chile's
place in this new globalized and interdependent world. Chile is today a nation that
has left behind its traditional insularity, and, faced with globalization, has chosen
to try to influence it so as to minimize its risks and to take part in its opportunities.
Accomplishing these objectives will require diversified strategies. II
Taken together Chilean defense and foreign policies present three challenges:
first, contributing to international peace and security; second, participating in
Latin American governability and social cohesion; and, finally, becoming a b ridge
and platform between Latin America and Asia.
In meeting these challenges, the Chilean Navy is prepared-no easy task,
considering the size of the area to protect, the limited assets available and the
growing maritime interests-not only to fulfill the traditional naval role of national
defense, but to participate actively in preserving Chile's other maritime interests.
In that regard, in Chile the functions normally performed by coast guards in
other nations are the responsibility of the navy. Finally, the navy also participates
in international cooperation initiatives with other countries, particularly, as indicated previously, in operations conducted under UN auspices.
For many years, the navy has participated in multilateral and bilateral exercises
with other navies to develop the interoperability necessary for effective operations
in the maritime environment. An interesting example was the sponsorship of Panamanian Maritime Force training, and creating and participating in special exercises to increase security in the Panama Canal area.
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The Chilean navy is today a very efficient armed service comprised of a sound
and modern organization of men, infrastructure and the technical means to provide effective command and control. It is a navy that is fully capable of the necessaryand indispensable--coordination in its operations with international and government specialized agencies. The navy effectively covers Chilean territory from the
maritime boundary with Peru in the north to the Antarctic in the south and is
equipped with the aircraft and ships to control the open waters under Chilean jurisdiction and our littoral and internal waters.
Chile has developed a maritime power appropriate for its level of development
and a navy that is organized and equipped consistent with the principle that "a fleet
that concentrates on maintaining a presence on the high seas and patrolling in support of the sea lanes of communication is far more effective in identifying and
countering threats to one's national security than a coastal-defense fleet." 12

Confronting the New Threa ts
It is important to point out initially that in confronting the threats of the twenty-

first century, it is necessary to find appropriate responses to those threats within
the international system and responses that are consistent with international law.
Under the law of the sea, the flag State has the responsibility of exercisingjurisdiction and control over vessels registered under its flag and has the obligation of carrying it out in accordance with its own national legislation, the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention )13 and international
conventions approved within the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
framework.. The 1982 LOS Convention permits a State that has reason to believe
that jurisdiction and control have not been executed properly regarding a specific
vessel registered with another State to communicate this to the flag State, which is
to investigate and take any necessary actions to remedy the situation .1 4
Recognizing that the flag State has not always effectively fulfilled its obligation
of exercising jurisdiction and control over its flag vessels, the principle of portState control is provided for by various international conventions.IS This principle
empowers their port State to inspect foreign shipping in their ports. In addressing
port-State control, special mention must be made of the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).16 The primary objective of the ISPS Code
is to strengthen the security of international shipping, ports, waterways and the
high seas by directing governments, shipping companies and port operators to enhance the security of the maritime enterprise. The ISPS Code also places responsibility on port authorities to undertake detailed security assessments, including
response plans, to identify threats and vulnerab ilities. 11
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On the other hand, the 1982 LOS Conven tion provides explicit rights to the
coastal State within its EEZ regarding fishing and to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the maritime environment. IS There also are con ventions that permit a
coastal State to act beyond its EEZ, such as the International Intervention
Convention l9 in instances in which an accident beyond the EEZ causes pollution
that may affec t the coastal State, the International Conventio n for Search and Rescue (SAR)20 and others.

The Presential Sea as a Usefu l Tool for Confronting the New Threats
When the Presential Sea concept was first advanced, the threat was uncontrolled
exploitation of fishing stocks, particularly migratory and straddling fishing resources. Today the threats are far more diverse, b ut we believe the Presential Sea is
an alternative that can be useful in confronting these new threats.ll
But, what is the Chilean Presen tial Sea? Geographically, it is that part of the ocean
space between the outer limits of Chile's continental exclusive economic wne and
the meridian which, passing through the western edge of Easter Island's continental
shelf, extends north to the international boundary with Peru and south to the South
Pole. n It is depicted as follows:

Figure 1. Chilean Presential Sea and SAR Area of Responsibility23
163

Threats Emanatingfrom the Commons: A Chilean Approach

The Presential Sea is an area in which Chile maintains a presence to protect the
national interests and takes part in economic activities that will contribute to national development. "This concept expresses the will to be present in this part of
the high seas with the aim of projecting maritime interests regarding the rest of the
international community, watch over the environment, preserve the natural resources, with exact adherence to International LaW."24
The Presential Sea is Consistent with International Law

The concept of the Presential Sea was first articulated in 1991. Immediately there
were critics who expressed concern that the Presential Sea was an attempt to assert
Chilean jurisdiction beyond those limits established in the 1982 LOS Convention.
One writer described it as "a very disturbing precedent. "25
Professor Vicuna, who served as president of the Chilean Delegation to the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1983), responded
to those critics:
The meaning and extent of the Presential Sea can be explained in the light of the
developments set forth above since it closely responds to the expression of a special
interest of the coastal State, in this instance Chile, but which can also be applied to
many other geographical situations throughout the World .... [Ilt involves firstly the
participation in and surveillance ofthe activities undertaken by other States in the high
seas areas of particular interest to the coastal State. In this regard it is not a question of
excluding any State from such areas, but, on the contrary, of ensuring the active
inclusion of the coastal State concerned ... .
There is no question of exclusive coastal State rights involved in this concept, or the
drawing of new maritime boundaries in a legal sense; neither should participation in
such activities be understood as a kind of compulsory intervention by the coastal State
in the activities undertaken in by other countries, but only as ensuring its own right to
operate actively in the area. The concept expressly safeguards the legal status of the high
seas established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.... It follows
that the approach has been conceived in a manner entirely consistent with the current
status of the Law of the Sea. 26

Satya Nandan, who headed the Fijian delegation to the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea and served as chairman of the conference working groups on the exclusive economic zone, delimitation of maritime boundaries
and the high seas, in addressing the accomplishments of the 1982 LOS Convention,
believed:
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A major achievement of the 1982 Convention was to rationalize different uses and
thereby reconcile the competing interests of states. The balance thus attained has
greatly red uced the proliferation of incoherent regimes, as states adopt national
legislation to conform to the regimes of the Convention. In that sense, the Convention
has had a stabilizing effect, reducing uncertainty and instability in the peaceful use of
the oceans.27
He continued:
For the future, the interest of all nations in a peaceful order of the oceans lies in
uniform and consistent application of the principles established in the Convention.
Differences between parties and non parties to the Treaty, and even between non
parties, may be resolved by observing the norms of cooperative conduct and
international resolution established by the Convention. Open conflicts and
confrontations and unilateral assertions of new jurisdictional regimes will not
contribute to the stability and certainty necessary in the international movement
toward the rule of law. . UI
Jane Dalton observed a few years later that
[T Jhe Mar Presencial is a juridical concept offered to support Chilean national
aspirations. The challenge to Chile and the international community is to attain
Chilean aspirations within the framework of the existing Convention regime. The Mar
Presencial may be the tool that enables Chile to do so. It must not be the tool by which
the erosion of the regime begins.29
Beyond the fact that Chile desires a greater participatio n in Pacific Ocean activities, whether those are international trade, protection of the maritime environment, conservation of its reso urces or addressing threats arising on or coming
fro m its waters, it h as never been Chile's intention to act unilaterally, b ut th ro ugh
active participation in in ternational organizations, specifically, the Un ited Nations,
the Organization of American States an d the In ternational Maritime Organ ization.

Maritim e Domain Awareness
It is interesting to note how a similar concept to the Presential Sea h as been developed by the United States, wh ich h as labeled it Maritim e Domain Awaren ess
(MDA).3O Admiral Thom as Collins, comm andant of the US Coast G uard, speaking
at the US Naval War College, stated:

From a risk-mitigation perspective, MDA is perhaps the highest return element of our
application of maritime power. Simply put, MDA is processing comprehensive
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awareness of the vulnerabilities, th reats, and all matters of interest on the water. It
means having extensive knowledge of geography, weather, position of friendly vessels
and potential threats, trends, key indicators, anomalies, intent and the activities of all
vessels in an area of concern, including the innocent.... If knowledge is power, and
MDA provides us the requisite knowledge of the maritime [spectrum], then MDA is
the key to maritime power. MDA, and the knowledge it will bring. will allow maritime
forces to respond with measured and appropriate force to meet any threat on, beJowor
above the sea and, taken to an ultimate state, will provide the necessary awareness to
create "nonevents," proactively preventing incidents, challenges, and devastation.3l

International Cooperation and Voluntary Agreements
Vice Admiral John Morgan, deputy chief of naval operations for information,
plans and strategy, and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio. director of the Strategy
and Policy Division. in the US Navy's Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in
describing the importance of the seas and the interests of all nations in ensuring the
security of the oceans, stated:
Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime commons is a key
element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation's long-term economic
well-being. The impact of the commons on trade, international commerce, and the
movement of people is significant. making security on the high seas, and in the world's
littorals, harbors, and ports, a cornerstone of prosperity. Likewise, the exploitation of
the maritime domain by nations, groups. or individuals must be considered a global
challenge. Policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of
th reats is a high priority for all nations interested in the economic prosperity and
security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain. "}2
Admiral Collins. in his 2003 address at the International Seapower Symposium,
described how 9/1 1 forced the United States to rethink its approach to maritime
power in the context of maritime security as resting purely on military power in
indicating:
[Mlaritime security is a concerted effort that encompasses more than just protecting
the nation's national interest against hostile nations, clearly. It includes protection
against terrorist attacks; protection of our sovereign natural resources, environment,
and the like. To reduce these risks in this new security environment, it requires a special
application, I think, of concerted, integrated maritime power at four major areas of
emphasis: to ( 1) increase our awareness of all activities and events in the maritime
environment; (2) very importantly, build and administer an effective maritime
security regime both domestically and internationally; (3) increase military and civil
operational presence-persistent presence--in our ports and coastal zones and
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beyond, for a layered security posture; and (4) improve our response posture in the
event a security incident does occur. 3)

The twenty-three States attending the 2003 ASEAN Regional Forum emphasized the importance of national and regional cooperation to the maintenance of
maritime security.
To deal with this increasingly violent international crime, it is necessary to step up
broad-based regional cooperative efforts to combat transnational organized crime,
including through cooperation and coordination among all institutions concerned,
such as naval units, coastal patrol and law enforcement agencies. shipping companies,
crews, and port authorities;
Such efforts must be based on relevant international law, including the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention;
It is important that there be national and regional cooperation to ensure that maritime
criminals and pirates do not evade prosecution;
Effective response to maritime crime requires regional maritime security strategies and
multilateral cooperation in their implementation;
National, Regional and International efforts to combat terrorism also enhance the
ability to combat transnational organized crime and armed-robberies [sic[ against
ships.}!

We think international organizations have an important role, particularly the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), which effectively addresses a wide
variety of maritime affairs, in furthering international cooperation. International
instruments and recommendations/guidelines have been approved for the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships and fixed platforms, including
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation 35 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platfonns Located on the Continental Shelf.\6; the 1974
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,37 particularly the new Chapter XI-2, the International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code}8; the 2005 Protocol of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation 39 ; and the Protocol of2005 for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.40 IMO
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measures adopted to enhance maritime security have greatly contributed to
strengthening international maritime security.
The contributions of international o rganizations have been recognized in a
range ofinternational conferences; for example, in January 2006, the Tokyo Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security "welcomed and supported
the vigorous maritime security activities undertaken by relevant international organizations, particularly, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the
World Custom s Organization ( WCO) . "~1
Also, the Ninth Asia Pacific Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies (APHMSA) Forum,
held in Vifi a del Mar, Chile from April 18-22, 2006,42 stressed that the figh t against
international terrorism and criminal acts at sea constitutes a goal for all States, with
the purpose of assuring people's integrity and development through safe and free
trade, and that cooperation a mong member States is imperative in addressing
these non-traditional threats. During the forum, the US delegation explained the
meaning of Maritime Dom ain Awareness (MDA). The communique issued at the
conclusion of the forum addressed MDA as follows:
It was also acknowledged by the Forum that for MDA to be effective, information from
all maritime mission areas must be integrated, and that the sharing of maritime
information among international partners. particularly among APHMSA members. is
essential in achieving transparency. ...
Noting the great potential for MDA to contribute to manyaspect[sJ of maritime safety,
SAR, environmental protection, as well as security, the Forum suggested further work
should be carried out or discussed at raj future meeting regarding the precise benefits
which can be derived.43
There are a number of voluntary agreements created by the United States after
9/ 11 that are designed to address threats from and on the sea. These include the
Container Security Initiative (CSI),« the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)45
and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI ),46 directed specifically at the
Strait of Malacca. While the international community supports their objectives,
[They] have received a mixed bag of responses fro m the maritime nations. The PSI
raises some fundamental issues under the United Nations Convention of the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Maritime specialists argue that under the customary international
law all vessels have the freedom of movement on the high seas and therefore the
freedom of navigation on the high seas is absolute. Therefore, there is no justification
in boarding and searching a ship if it has a nationality, not engaged in piracy or slave
trade. Analysts doubt the right of the powerful nations to violate the basic principles
and norms enshrined in the UNCLOS. .. . The daunting challenge however, is how to
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address these Initiatives in a comprehensive, yet cost-effective way, withou t
challenging sovereignty issues and dramatically restraining the flow of commerce."47

Another author's concerns were not just with the legal issues raised by the CSI
and PSI but with their focus on protecting US interests and the unilateral process
by which they were created:
So far, many states have gone along with CSI and PSI. However, the high costs of
compliance evoke images of colonialism and hegemony. The stationing of U.S.
Customs officials in the sovereign ports of foreign states might be seen as intrusive. PSI
and CSI may also limit the rights of commercial vessels operating internationally to
remain free from arbitrary search and seizure. The initiatives are d irected exclusively
toward safeguarding U.S.-boundshipping. ... Further, they exclude WMD and related
shipments by the U.S. to its allies. On the whole, CSI and PSI lack transparency,
reciprocity, and accountability; they are unilateral U.S. measures prompted by the 9111
attacks.
It may be that this is the necessary cost of increased maritime security in the twentyfirst century. If many countries are willing to accept this type of non-consultative and
unilaterally-driven process that would indicate a very significant change in the way
international regulations are framed and implemented. It would constitute a major
shih from negotiated multilateralism of the post-war system to cooperative
unilateralism under post-Cold War American hegemony.48

We believe that necessary changes or modifications to international legislation
must be accomplished within the framework of the United Nations. The history of
efforts to create new international conventions or modify existing oneS has shown,
however, that this can sometimes be a lengthy process. In the face of the new
threats and the dangers they create, the international community must be prepared
to act promptly to adopt procedures that provide effective responses to terrorism
and proliferation.
The law of the sea has developed and evolved over centuries of the use of the
oceans. Sometimes those changes can occur rapidly; other times-and more frequently--changes require a lengthy period. An example of the latter is the definition of piracy as it appears in the 1982 LOS Convention,49 a definition that has
existed essentially unchanged for hundreds of years. In addressing the need to
change the law, the political advisor to Striking Force NATO obselVes:
In recent years, efforts have been made to loosen the restrictive UNCLOS definition [of
piracy]. The 1988 Rome Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA)
dropped the high seas and private act limitations of Article 101, but SUA focuses on
jurisdiction, not enforcement. The signatories are required to criminalize such acts,

169

Threats Emanatingfrom the Commons: A Chilean Approach
and to either exercise jurisdiction over persons in their territory, or to extradite them to
another state with a valid stake in the action. Crucially, it does not authorize hot
pursuit.
What then, can states and navies, legally do?
On the high seas, and within one's own waters, boarding and arrest can be exercised
under the universal jurisdiction rubric. or where the pirates are of that state's
nationality....

Also relevant are recent anti-terrorist initiatives, such as the 2005 revisions to the SUA
convention that allow states to agree that others may board vessels flying their flag after
notification.
In practice, acts of piracy and maritime terrorism may be indistinguishable, the
question of intent usually determined after the fact. Thus initiatives to suppress
terrorism may assist in the fight against piracy, and vice versa. 50
We believe a more straightforward approach is to make proliferation ofweapons o f mass destruction a global crime, like slavery or piracy. Today the law provides that warships of any nation have the right to visit a ship where there is
reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in slavery or piracy or is
stateless. 51 Given the new threats. it is not reasonable that action cannot be taken in
cases of terrorism at sea.

Conclusion
Chile is dependent on the sea. In our opinion, Chile recognizes the threats created
by the current international environment to the use of the oceans and is forward
looking in identifying future circumstances that could affect the nation. The Chilean government has developed and articulated policies that provide appropriate
guidance to government agencies in directing their organizations to carry out
those policies. Specifically in the case of the navy, it has d eveloped and adapted its
means towards the objectives established by the government.
Effective responses to illicit acts require multilateral cooperation at both the international and regional level. While the possible solutions to the new threats are to
be found principally working with the United Nations and the International Maritime Organization, we must look beyond them to various national public and private agencies and organizations that are in charge of maritime security. The
solutions adopted to date are properly focused by involving not only governm ents
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but also shipping companies, port authorities, customs officials, navies, coast
guards, etc.
We believe that ensuring "good order at sea" worldwide requires an improved
level of awareness, effective policy and integrated governance. The United Nations
must be the structure within which States act to develop the long-term legal framework. We recognize, however, that there must be a mechanism, such as that provided by the International Maritime Organization, there to provide the short-term
guidance required for the maritime power of States to effectively confront the
threats not just as they arise, but hopefully before they appear.
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention has been the vital legal structure to keep
order at sea. Even if the prerogatives of the flag State are irreplaceable, port-State
control has become an efficient complement. Even so, we think that whatever prerogatives the law of the sea confers upon individual States, the Presential Sea concept is a useful tool for the surveillance of the high seas adjacent to the exdusive
economic zone. It provides an "area of responsibility" for States to provide the
control of that sea space necessary to address the new threats, without affecting in
the least the freedom of the seas. On the contrary, it preserves the freedom to use
the seas and makes that use safer for mankind.
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